Prime
Britain aids Tanzania in toppling Amin
What you need to know:
- Anniversary. April 11 marked 39 years since Idi Amin was overthrown by a combined force of Tanzania People’s Defence Forces and Ugandan exiles.
- But in the shadows was Britain that helped the forces overthrow Amin.
The 1979 Uganda-Tanzania war, which began on October 28, 1978, was the first between two former British colonies on the African continent. By its start, Britain’s policy was on economy and aid in order to have influence in Africa. Military intervention was least likely.
The British government led by prime minister James Callaghan had little interest in Africa, but was more than happy to have then president Idi Amin out.
Writing in the book War in Uganda, journalists Tony Avirgan and Martha Hone say: “Basically the Callaghan government decided that the time was ripe to remove Amin, even if in doing so Tanzania violated the OAU principle of territorial sanctity. It also put some rather ineffectual pressure on British oil companies, urging them to cut supplies to Amin.”
The British used a two-way policy approach to the war. On one hand they declared a non-intervention policy while on the other they covertly supported the removal of Amin. This covert policy was developed and implemented by lower level officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) stationed in the East African Department (EAD) working with the British High Commissioners in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.
According to the FCO records of November 8, 1978, “The government condemn the Ugandan invasion. We hope there will be an early end to the fighting and that a peaceful settlement can be quickly achieved based on the OAU principle of respect for territorial integrity. We believe African disputes should, wherever possible, be settled in an African context.” Despite the above declaration, in action Britain did the opposite.
British interest in the war
One of the reasons for the British intervention in the war was to counter the potential growth of communist influence in the region.
Tanzania had adopted socialism and cooperation with China while Amin had declared anti-Western policies to win financial favours from the communist and Arab counties. It was these connections that made Britain feel that its influence in the region was being challenged.
The war gave the FCO officials a chance to increase their influence since both the Soviet Union (Russia) and China were not openly taking sides in the war.
According to a report titled The Uganda/Tanzania: Considerations for UK Policy, FCO November 7, 1978, Britain wanted “to avoid giving an opening for Soviet or Cuban intervention and the introduction of an East-West dimension”.
And in a November 10, 1978, communication from FCO to Peter JS Moon, Britain’s High Commissioner to Tanzania, the office cautioned that any delay in willingness to help Tanzania would play in favour of the communist countries.
“We must take into account the possibility that if we appear unwilling to help Tanzania at a time of need, she may turn to others such as the Russians who do have instant equipment,” the communication read.
Britain was not ready to leave Uganda despite having severed diplomatic relations even before the war broke out.
In a February 9, 1979, FCO communication from John A Robson to Derek M Day, the Commonwealth Office noted that “Britain still has substantial interests in Uganda, and is determined to increase its influence there; any revival of British influence in Uganda was contingent upon his [Amin’s] overthrow”.
Britain fuelling crisis in Uganda
By the break of war, Uganda and Britain only had bilateral trade relations which also collapsed when Uganda invaded Tanzania. The bilateral trade was restricted to luxury goods and oil. Britain thought that restricting oil supplies to Uganda would fuel internal political crisis leading to the toppling of Amin.
Earlier on, three American oil companies – Mobil, Esso and Caltex – that supplied 40 per cent of the country’s oil had closed their operations in Uganda.
Britain wanted the remaining two firms, Shell and British Petroleum (BP), supplying another 40 per cent to also to withdraw. This would leave the French and Italian companies Total and Agip respectively as the only oil suppliers. The two were responsible for the remaining 20 per cent supply of oil in the country. Britain also tried to influence Kenya to reduce the flow of oil products to Uganda. But Kenya preferred to keep its neutrality.
In November 1978 the British through the FCO asked the French and Italian governments to persuade their oil companies to cut down or stop supplying oil to Uganda.
France, which had a stable relationship with Amin and disliked Nyerere, responded that it would treat the question of oil supply to Uganda as a purely commercial question as it had no desire to intervene in an African conflict and would not ask Total to limit supplies.
The Italians had no intention of intervening either, but admitted that the Ugandan invasion created special circumstances and that there might now be a case for urging restraint on Agip if the Tanzanians were to ask the Italian government to do so.
Besides oil, the other area of bilateral trade Britain had with Uganda was through the Stansted flights. FCO had wanted to stop the flights as soon as the war started but the British Secretary of State for Trade, Edmund Dell, allowed the flights to continue.
On November 13, 1978, David Owen, the secretary for Overseas Development, renewed his demand for the suspension of the flights to Uganda.
“I believe that Amin’s attack on a friendly Commonwealth country, and the internal situation in Uganda, have produced a new situation in which the question of action against the flights should be reconsidered. We now have reason to believe that stopping these flights from Stansted, and with them the flow of luxury items to Amin’s military supporters, will weaken his authority over his soldiers,” Owen said.
“I believe we should not let slip an opportunity to take action which might tip the scales against Amin and that there is a strong case for finding means to suspend the flights from Stansted. If action against the flights is to have the impact we want, it is important to move swiftly to take advantage of the present unrest.”
In January 1979, the Tanzanian forces entered Uganda, making them the aggressors and Uganda the victims. This called for Britain to condemn Tanzania as it had earlier done to Uganda.
Not willing to change what it had started, secrecy in supporting Tanzania in its aggression became a top priority.
Britain embarked on diplomatic assistance to Tanzania. One such act was the cancellation of the Stansted flights to Uganda. They also made sure that Obote was not fronted by Tanzania as the next president of Uganda and also made sure that Amin’s appeal to the UN Security Council when Tanzania declared their intentions to get rid of him was never tabled before the UN.
More involved in the war
By March, Britain had become more involved in the war. This came about after realising that Amin’s fall was inevitable. The eminent fall of Amin revived British interest in Uganda, hence increased military support to the Tanzanian campaign.
According to records labelled FCO March 2, 1979, between two British officials John W Yapp and John A Robson, “Britain’s help would have the added benefit of preparing the ground for British influence over a Ugandan successor government.”
Victory for Britain
When Tanzanian troops matched onto the streets of Kampala, it was more than a military victory for the British.
In a memorandum titled The Tanzania/Uganda War: Act 2, in records marked FCO April 30, 1979, the British said: “We were pleased that he had been replaced by a politically moderate government with an expressed desire for close cooperation with Britain.”
Britain was quick to congratulate Yusuf Lule as president promising aid and assistance to a new regime.
They go on to say in The Tanzania/Uganda War: Act 2: “From our point of view the outcome of the Tanzania/Uganda war has so far been largely a gain. We are glad to see Africa disembarrassed of Amin.
The assistance and support we have given to Tanzania have been to the benefit of British-Tanzanian relations. We now also have the prospect of renewing fruitful relations with Uganda. What may require careful handling in the future is the balance of our relations between the three East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.”
