Prime
The first coup in Uganda
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Godfrey Binaisa. File photo
What you need to know:
The big men’s role. The military coup by Amin was civilianised by Godfrey Binaisa who drew the statement attributing change of government to Obote.
The common element of the three longest serving Presidents of Uganda; Milton Obote, Idi Amin and Yoweri Museveni is that they assumed power through the military. The mode of capturing power determines how it is exercised. This is why we revisit the first military coup in Uganda on February 22, 1966.
The background to the coup was a struggle for Uganda’s leadership between Grace Ibingira and Obote. The contest became open from September 1965. On June 12, 1965 Dr Lumu, Abu Mayanja and Segwanga-Musisi replaced Binaisa, Kintu-Musoke and Bidandi-Sali as UPC leaders in Buganda. This change meant that the five anti-Obote ministers; Ibingira, George Magezi, Dr Lumu, Baraki-Kirya and Matthias Ngobi together controlled majority UPC branches. If Obote survived through February and March 1966 as Prime Minister, they were certain to oust him as UPC president in the April 1966 UPC National delegates Conference.
On September 7, 1965 Obote revealed that Ibingira had received $1 million from USA to fight socialism in Uganda. On September 12, 1965 Ibingira declared the need to oust Obote’s ‘communism’ from Uganda. On October 17, 1965, Kirunda-Kivejinja told a UPC public rally to resist Ibingira’s move to topple Obote and sell Uganda to capitalism.
All the political forces in Uganda; Members of Parliament, the Cabinet, Army, police, DP, UPC branches and Buganda Lukiiko sided with either Obote or Ibingira, taking sides because they were either northerners or southerners, or on the ideology of ‘socialism’ for Obote and ‘capitalism’ for Ibingira.
When democracy failed
Ibingira initially sought to oust Obote using democratic means. The excuse was provided by Bank of Baroda through its Main Branch manager, Mr Rakesha, who revealed Col. Amin seeking to sell gold and ivory. The bank, which opposed socialism, also leaked a photocopy of the bank statement of Col. Amin with large deposits and withdrawals.
This was backed by Capt. Kisembo narrating to Daudi Ochieng and Brig. Opolot at the home of Paul Kavuma, the delivery of Congo gold and ivory. The evidence implicated Obote, Amin, Onama and Nekyon.
The political forces behind Ibingira backed Ochieng’s motion intended to oust Obote. A committee titled, Gather Information for Daudi Ochieng Motion (GIDOM), was established to coordinate the democratic ousting of Obote.
GIDOM was chaired by Abu Mayanja of KY movement, deputised by Alex Latim of DP. Obote was cornered as GIDOM had sufficient evidence. Beside Col. Amin’s bank statement, they had details of the house on Plot 21, Prince Charles Drive at Kololo, which Obote had bought.
In Parliament, Obote had charged John Kakonge with mobilising UPC MPs to reject the gold and ivory motion. Kakonge failed as MPs instead endorsed an inquiry incriminating Obote and the immediate suspension of Col. Amin.
Ibingira and Mutesa group’s plan to trounce Obote in Parliament had thus also failed. They wanted Parliament to move towards “directly against Obote” instead of the extended process of an incriminating inquiry.
The unworkable Parliament resolution required Obote to appoint an Inquiry Committee that would pin him down. It also required Onama to suspend Amin over a deal they executed together.
On February 3, 1966, Obote had retreated to West Nile, Acholi and Lango, before the Motion in Parliament on February 5, the same year. There, Obote tribalised his corruption problem as a Bantu-against-Nilotics contest. Having failed in Parliament, Ibingira and Mutesa also moved towards directly criminalising Obote.
The Cabinet endorsed Parliament’s resolution but when the letter for Obote to return to Kampala and appoint the Inquiry Committee was delivered, he (Obote) expected arrest and ran off naked as he was bathing. Obote organised with the Police Commissioner from the north called Oryema, to prevent arrest and then returned at night on February 12, 1966.
With police on Obote’s side, his opponents turned to the army for the criminal arrest. On February 14, 1966, Brig. Opolot directed the transfer of Maj. Oyite-Ojok from Mbuya to Moroto and ordered the 1st and 3rd Battalions under Majors Okoya and Tito Okello for a physical training exercise without live ammunition. The army officers were considered likely to resist Obote’s arrest. However, it was Col. Amin supposed to effect these orders but he didn’t.
Obote was protected by 14 armed police at Entebbe. On the morning of February 15, 1966, Brig. Opolot approached Lt. Smarts Fred Guweddeko and ordered him to deploy his military guard platoon at Entebbe Airforce Base to arrest Obote. Lt. Guweddeko required a higher order from President Mutesa, which did not come. On the same morning Col. Amin approached President Mutesa offering to shift sides if the charges could be dropped.
Mutesa was not definitive. That evening, Col. Amin approached Lt. Guweddeko at Entebbe. Amin advised Lt. Guweddeko not to arrest Obote without informing him (Amin).
Public talk was that Obote was “politically finished” and was trying to overthrow the Constitution. In defence, Obote issued a press brief.
“I have led the government with clean hands. I have received nothing from Congo. I am not corrupt. I do not practise tribalism. I have worked for unity; I have no intention to overthrow the Constitution,” he said in the brief.
Prime Minister Obote did not appoint the Inquiry Committee and Onama did not suspend Col. Amin as required by Parliament. The committee could indict Obote and Col. Amin had warned that if suspended he would reveal everything. With police on their side, Obote and Onama approached Col. Amin, promising to make him the Army Commander for siding with them.
On February 15, 1966, Daudi Ochieng told the Press that Obote had no alternative but to resign. The chairman of GIDOM, the committee executing “Obote-overthrow”, Abu Mayanja, said Onama was in contempt of Parliament by not immediately suspending Amin.
On the morning of February 17, 1966, Obote flew to Nairobi on official duty but his first move was to inquire if the terms of the British troops stationed there included intervening in Uganda if the political situation exploded.
That day’s afternoon, President Mutesa and five Ministers; Ibingira, Lumu, Balaki-Kirya, Ngobi and Magezi met the British High Commissioner to Uganda, Mr Roland Hunt, requesting for military aid against the northern-dominated army and police.
Both Prime Minister Obote and President Mutesa received negative responses to their inquiry and request. This was an advantage to Obote and disadvantage to the Mutesa-and-Ibingira group.
Obote returned to Uganda on the February 20, 1966. The Inquiry Commission had to be announced by Feb 23; Col Amin had to be suspended before then.
On the morning of February 21, 1966, Obote asked Col. Amin in front of Onama and Oryema to take over the government with a coup. Col. Amin refused and replied that Obote should take over and he (Amin) will support.
That evening, Col. Amin went to Jinja with Maj. Okoya and addressed soldiers. Amin said Uganda had been attacked by foreign troops invited by Mutesa and Brig. Opolot. Col. Amin arrested Baganda and Ankole officers and soldiers and mobilised troops under Maj. Arach and Maj. Oketch, arriving at Nakawa towards the dawn of February 22, 1966.
But the previous evening, Maj. Oyite-Ojok had stationed a guard platoon of soldiers at the Mbuya Army headquarters. That night the Oyite-Ojok platoon was sieged at the army headquarters by two Coys of soldiers commanded by Capt. Ongodia and Capt. Erima under Maj. Kakuhikire.
Meanwhile, the Special Force and Police under Oryema organised to arrest the five ministers opposed to Obote in the GIDOM plot and surrounded the homes of other GIDOM MPs.
Conspiring ministers arrested
On the morning of February 22, 1966, shortly before the five conspiring ministers were arrested at Entebbe, Col. Amin’s troops advanced from Nakawa to capture Mbuya Army headquarters from Captains Ongodia and Erima.
Brig. Opolot, with a platoon under Lt. Zadock Ariko, joined troops under Maj. Kakuhikire with Capt. Ongodia, Capt. F.X Erima but were prevented from taking over army headquarters, the armoury and Signals Command Centre by the platoon under Maj. Oyite-Ojok. Then Col. Amin’s troops under Maj. Arach and Maj. Oketch arrived and disarmed the Brig. Opolot troops at Mbuya. The coup was militarily executed with very few bullets fired as Brig. Opolot had no access to arms and Signals Command Centre to control the army.
On the evening of February 22, 1966, Obote announced the dismissal of President Mutesa, suspended the Constitution, assumed all executive powers and appointed Col. Amin to replace Brig. Opolot as Army Commander. Obote gave two reasons for overthrowing the constitutional government.
To prevent use of the gold frame-up to impeach him and prevent a military coup by President Mutesa and Ibingira group.
The military coup by Amin was civilianised by Godfrey Binaisa who drew the statement attributing change of government to Obote. Obote’s coup was challenged by Abu Mayanja and the DP leader, Okello. If Obote was innocent, why did he fear the inquiry? Why could he not charge the military coup plotters with treason instead of also staging a military coup?
Mr Guweddeko is a doctorate fellow at Makerere Institute of Social Research – Makerere University.
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