New US spy files reveal chaotic last days of Obote II regime

“In our judgment, increased aid will do little to vent the underlying pressures on his regime, which stem from intense tribal rivalries, military indiscipline, and opportunistic intrigue within the government.

 We cannot discount the possibility of Obote’s removal by coup or assassination,” read the CIA files which were compiled in 1984 barely a year before Obote was overthrown.
Then Brig Bazilio, the son of Chief Langoya Rwonomoi, was born in Poyamo clan of Madi-Opei, Lamwo District (then Kitgum District), in 1928. He was a confessed DP supporter and highly placed sources claim that the Catholic Church’s highest prelate in Uganda backed the coup he led on July 27, 1985.

The CIA’s declassified files portray a picture of panic as Obote in his last days, tried to purge the army of dissenters by creating a 5,000 special brigade whose nucleus was drawn from grassroots youth from families with unflinching support to his UPC party.  
During an announcement on Radio Uganda, Tito Okello-Lutwa was declared the chairperson of the Military Council and Head of State and promoted to General, while Bazilio Olara-Okello was promoted to the rank of Lt Gen and appointed chief of the armed forces. 

Obote turns to North Korea
“Uncertainty over the Western military aid commitment has prompted Obote to rely increasingly on the North Koreans. According to the US Embassy, the North Koreans are currently providing training for army artillery specialists, VIP protection training, intelligence and security training, and paramilitary training of UPC’s youth wingers,” read the CIA files.
The records placed the number of North Korean officers who had been sent to Uganda to specifically undertake ‘military, intelligence and security adviser’ assignments at 50.

North Korea also hosted 50 to 60 Ugandan army officers in its country.
According to the US Embassy, “these [North Korean] advisers were asked to train the police Special Forces, filling the gap created by the withdrawal of Falcon-star. The US Embassy reports that 50 to 60 Ugandan army officers and noncommissioned officers are undergoing four to six months of training in North-Korea.”

Obote had earlier on crafted a relationship with North Korea after he visited P’yongyang later in 1981. According to the CIA files, the country responded to the warm ties by sending him a small number of military advisers, and accepted some Ugandans for training in North Korea. 
However, the relationship between North-Korea and Uganda showed signs of friction, according to the files. 

“For example, members of the North Korean contingent have complained of lack of support from Kampala and, despite continued efforts by Ugandan officials, have refused to conduct the training of the Special Forces in dissident-infested areas because of their concern for their personal safety,” read the files.
The North Koreans had shored up Obote’s fragile regime by pushing back NRA rebels under Yoweri Museveni in the Luweero jungles, through the salvo of Katyushas, a gun retreating German troops ruefully referred to as Stalin’s organ during the Second World War.

The ensuing chaos in the Ugandan military prompted Obote to look to his old ally, Tanzania, for help. Obote later sent his Army Chief of Staff to meet with the Tanzanian Chief of Defence to discuss the deployment of a Tanzanian combat force into Uganda.
However, President Nyerere decided not to commit his soldiers and is “considering withdrawing the Tanzanian advisers currently in Uganda.”
Obote then persuaded the United Kingdom and several Commonwealth countries to participate in a military training programme and hired a private British firm, Falcon-Star, to train the police.

Enter Russia, Cuba
The CIA reports also indicated that Obote sought to throw caution to the wind and reach out to Russia and Cuba for military support.  “So far the risk of jeopardising vital Western economic aid has deterred Obote from taking up recent Cuban and Soviet offers of military assistance, but we believe the potential for a turn to Havana or Moscow will grow if security continues to deteriorate. We do not have reliable evidence of any Cuban military personnel in Uganda, but 30 to 40 Ugandan officers are undergoing military training in Havana. The Ugandans explored the USSR’s [Russia] availability as a potential source of military aid last August, after Obote’s Internal Affairs minister, Prof John Luwuliza-Kirunda, visited Moscow,” the files add.
The CIA files suggested that a flare-up of Langi-Acholi tribal rivalry within the Ugandan Army had put further stress on the stability of the regime of President Obote, a Langi. 

“Obote put Langi troops on military alert in May, suggesting he either feared an Acholi coup, or was looking for a pretext to rein in senior Acholi officers. Obote’s decision to create a new Langi special military unit prior to elections scheduled later this year also has contributed to tribal tensions,” read the files.
Oyite-Ojok’s death exposes fault-lines
This row largely escalated after the death of the charismatic Chief of Staff, David Oyite-Ojok, on December 2, 1983. 
The helicopter he was flying in with eight others suddenly nose-dived and plunged to the ground where it burst into flames, killing all on board. 

This was barely after the plane took off from Luweero where Oyite-Ojok was giving instructions to senior UNLA commanders about his war blueprint to annihilate NRA rebels.  
The files indicated that the highly-respected Oyite-Ojok, who was of the same ethnicity with Obote, had sustained the regime by his vigorous counter-insurgency efforts against the NRA rebels and his death had energised the enemy fighters.

In the aftermath of Oyite-Ojok’s death, Obote assigned extra roles to Tito Okello Lutwa, an Acholi, who was the head of the armed forces then . 
The CIA files stated that, “as Ojok’s ‘acting successor’ avoiding the politically volatile issue of selecting a permanent replacement reflected the problems he faced in handling the military. 
According to the US Embassy, the Acholi made up about 60 per cent of the army, and the selection of [Tito] Okello probably stemmed from Obote’s fear of an Acholi revolt if another Langi was appointed to the top military post.
“We agree with the US Embassy that naming Okello to assume Ojok’s responsibilities is only a temporary expedient, an example of Obote’s penchant for putting off decisions that might cause discord,” the files stated.

 According to CIA, Okello’s limited abilities and lack of charisma offered little hope about his leadership abilities.  “In our view, Obote’s choice of Okello as interim leader has aggravated the army’s factionalism; resentment is growing in both Acholi and Langi  factions as they press their candidates for a permanent successor, according to the US embassy officials,” they state.

“Obote faces an uphill battle in trying to maintain the loyalty and discipline of the tribally-fractured military. Effective government control over the military ended with the death of his close ally and Chief of Staff Ojok, a Langi, in a helicopter crash last December. Since then, Obote, aware of the bitter Langi-Acholi rivalry within the Army, has avoided the politically volatile issue of naming a permanent successor to the post.”

Appointment of Smith Opon Acak 
Obote later appointed his own kinsman, Brig Smith Opon Acak, to the coveted position of army Chief of Staff, ahead of the more experienced and battle-tested but less educated Bazilio Olara-Okello, a decision, which caused rancour.  

The CIA reports claim that high-level Acholi military officers expressed disgruntlement with the Obote regime. 
“In recent months, however, the number and bitterness of their complaints appear to have increased. They claim Langi officers are promoted rapidly to the detriment of Acholi military careers. The most powerful positions are held by Langi officers, many of whom owe personal loyalty to Obote, according to US Embassy sources,” the reports read. The files revealed that Acholi members of the military alleged that they were sent to the front to fight against insurgents from the National Resistance Army, while Langi enlisted personnel were given non-combat positions. 

Acholi officers, the reports claim, preferred a negotiated settlement to end the war but “Langi officers opposed negotiations and were prolonging the fighting at the Acholi’s expense.”
To nip in the bud the plot to oust him, Obote, according to CIA files, intensified military recruitment in Lango. 

“His aim was to create a 5,000-man special brigade personally loyal to him and composed entirely of members of the ruling Ugandan People’s Congress party. Embassy sources maintain this brigade will be used as shock troops to intimidate and assassinate rivals of the Obote regime, especially during the upcoming elections. The brigade probably will focus primarily on the small Democratic and National Liberal Parties, supported by the Acholi, but, in addition, will be used to ensure loyalty within the ruling party,” the files state.
Reports suggested that Obote was determined to augment the security services to ensure stability during the elections, which were to be held in December 1985. 

UNLA siege of Brig Langoya 
During the heightened spell, Langi troops moved directly against the Acholi. According to Embassy sources, while Brig Jikirani Langoya, an Acholi, the chief of engineering and logistics, quarter master general of the army and protege of Okello, was away from his head office at Republic House in Bulange, on April 19 when Langi troops surrounded the building. 
This action was taken on the orders of Army Chief of Staff Smith Opon Acak, a Langi.

 “We believe that the action against Langoya was part of a Langi troop alert. Langi troops drawn primarily from the presidential escort were placed around army headquarters and at strategic points in Kampala without the knowledge of [Tito] Okello, whose authority appears to have been circumvented. Langoya, who is rabidly anti-Obote and has been implicated numerous times as a coup plotter, is now under arrest and has been relieved of military duties,” the CIA files read in part. As fault-lines continued to emerge, then Capt Ocero Nagai ordered the transfer of armoured personnel carriers (APCs) from Makindye to Mbuya without the knowledge of the Chief of Staff. 

Capt Ocero’s plan was to drive the APCs to Radio Uganda and announce a coup. 
But the Army Chief of Staff went to Mbuya and removed the APCs. This is what then Vice President Paul Muwanga, described as the ‘uncoordinated movement of troops.’
The dispute between the Acholi and the Langi escalated further when two Langi officers, Maj Wacha Olwol and Lt Okabo from Makindye, bombed houses of officers such as Ocero Nagai at Bugolobi and that of Lt Col Obonyo at Entebbe without any order from the Chief of Staff.
The survival of the Obote regime, according to the files, depended on a military whose loyalty was questionable and whose actions he couldn’t control. A desultory, often brutal war with the guerrillas had dragged on since Obote assumed power in the disputed elections in 1980.

The files also claim that military indiscipline had severely hampered army operations against various guerrilla groups. The guerrillas [NRA] easily overran an army barracks at Masindi, less than 200 miles from the capital in late February, replenishing their meagre arms stock. 
“The guerrillas, emboldened by this and other recent successes, probably will continue to employ the hit-and-run tactics against which the army has thus far been ineffective,” the files stated.

In March 1984, in reaction to a dissident assault on a satellite communications station about 10 miles east of Kampala, the UNLA conducted a sweep of the area, during which units attacked a nearby seminary and terrorised the local population. 
The files revealed that witnesses claimed that the brutal savagery went on for several days, ending only when the soldiers could find no further victims or loot to carry off. The US Embassy estimated that some 85 civilians were killed.  Obote, frustrated by the brutality of the army and his inability to control it, according to the US Embassy, departed from his customary silence on such events and publicly condemned the action.

Overall, the bloated ranks, low pay, and lack of discipline in the army, contributed to Obote’s fall. 
The US Embassy in Kampala reported that “there are about 35,000 to 40,000 men under arms in the various services. 

Only about 15,000 enlisted or commissioned personnel have received basic training; some 15,000 to 25,000 soldiers in regular and militia units have little or no military training. Obote recognises the problems inherent in his inflated and undertrained force structure but is reluctant to reduce the size of the army for fear of turning large numbers of unemployed armed men loose amid the local population.”

The US Embassy notes claimed that the government could afford to feed no more than 20,000 men. As a result, many soldiers stole food and supplies from civilians, and the US Embassy reported increased instances where entire villages were looted. 

“Among the most victimised have been the non­-Acholi ethnic groups around Kampala and in southern Uganda, whose deep-seated animosity toward the predominantly Acholi troops has reinforced the soldiers’ inclination to mistreat them, thus perpetuating the cycle where popular support for the government has eroded,” the CIA files stated.

UPC party power struggle

The CIA files claimed there was a power struggle within the UPC government and the US Embassy stated that Obote presided over a civilian government, which he did not control. 

“The UPC is a fragile and polarised coalition of Obote’s Langi tribe and the Acholi, which together make up about 10 percent of Uganda’s population. Since these tribes constitute the largest groups in the army, the UPC has strong military support,” the files stated.

Nonetheless, the CIA files indicated that this was a weak power base for Obote because it was fragmented by the personal ambitions of a number of members, including Vice President and Minister of Defence Paulo Muwanga and Internal Affairs minister Prof John Luwuliza-Kirunda, who wanted to replace the president.

“Muwanga’s long competition with Obote has in the past year evolved into a bitter power struggle. According to the US Embassy, following the 1980 elections and into 1983, Muwanga was a convenient buffer between the Langi and Acholi in the army,” the CIA files state.

The CIA predicted that should Obote’s grip weaken further, ‘the Soviet-oriented Muwanga, described by US officials as a ruthless politician, might be tempted to move directly against him.’

“The press, however, reported that as the top Muganda in Obote’s government, Muwanga had many enemies. Among his own ethnic group, he is considered a traitor who has sold out to an anti-Buganda regime. At the same time, many in Obote’s inner-circle mistrust Muwanga because he is not one of their own,” the files stated.

The CIA files revealed that other UPC officials harboured presidential ambitions, including Chris Rwakasisi, the minister of state in the President’s office; and Edward Rurangaranga, the minister of state in the Prime Minister’s office.

“In our judgment, all are opportunists who would not hesitate to use extralegal methods to seize power if given the chance,” the files stated.
Barely after Obote was ousted, Muwanga was appointed Prime Minister in the Tito-Okello-led military junta. 

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