Al-Shabaab attack: The unanswered questions

An insider, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter, said one explanation is that by military doctrine the next-of-kin of the victims require to be notified first.

It remained unclear if this had been done. A number of officers reached out for this story declined to discuss details of the battlefield losses, saying an order against such disclosure was in place and violators risked being court-martialed. 

A source said where loss is “substantial”, commanders are more sensitive about timing and how much detail is shared because of the potential to scare or demoralise especially frontline troops.

A retired general argued that UPDF may be concerned that al-Shabaab could seize on the army’s full disclosure about its fatality and casualty numbers for propaganda, to inspire and enlist more “crusaders” and muster finances from sponsors.

Yet, at home, calls including by the Leader of Opposition in Parliament Mathias Mpuuga are growing louder for the military to be transparent and account for what happened by disclosing the numbers of soldiers lost or injured and the circumstances. 

Separate statements issued by President Museveni, a retired general and commander-in-chief of the army, and the military itself did not confirm or confute the claims by the al-Shabaab.

“The Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) [Gen Wilson Mbadi] has set up a Board of Inquiry (BOI) and the full facts will come out, including the details of the casualties,” the President noted in a statement that State House shared at 11:45pm on Saturday night.

One source described the militants’ claim that they killed up to 137 UPDF troops during the Friday attack as “grossly exaggerated”, and said Uganda lost “under 100” troops, a vague reference to a band of digits anywhere between zero and 99.

In a statement, the group reported destroying and seizing military vehicles, raiding a cache of weapons and ammunitions at the UPDF Forward Operating Base (FOB) and capturing some Ugandan soldiers.

A FOB is a secured military base armed and populated as a frontal position to support or respond to tactical demands in a war situation.

Shortly after the raid, the United States Africa Command (Africom) announced that it on Friday conducted precision airstrikes in the vicinity of Bulo Marer and “destroyed weapons and equipment unlawfully taken by al-Shabaab fighters” presumably from the UPDF Forward Operating Base.

“The command’s initial assessment is that no civilians were injured or killed, US Africa Command takes great measures to prevent civilian casualties,” Africom noted of the operation it said it conducted in support of the federal government of Somalia and African Union Transition Mission (Atmis), the Amisom successor.

Amisom, now ATMIS, is a United Nations-authorised peace-keeping mission to stabilise Somalia and Uganda was the first in 2007 to deploy to the Horn of Africa country where it remains the largest troop contributor.

Whereas UPDF deployed their without authorisation or briefing of Parliament as required by the Constitution, President Museveni who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, defended the decision as informed by pan-Africanism and its African solutions to African problems mantra.

The Ugandan military, later joined by armies from Kenya, Burundi and Djibouti, expelled al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and conquered hinterlands it occupied, but holding liberated areas has been challenged by the less-than-satisfactory capacity of Somali National Forces.

Foreign armies open-ended stay has also become a source of disquiet among both civilians and political/military leaders, turning the warm reception of yesteryears to grumbling, prompting stakeholders to agree that forces hatted under ATMIS draw down by nearly 10,000 by next year.

The UPDF base that al-Shabaab overwhelmed on Friday was manned by a Company, which is a military formation comprising 100-250 soldiers, and had in its arsenal t-55tanks armed with mounted machine guns and high explosive, armour-piercing firepower.

It also had 14.5mm anti- aircraft guns and 107mm Katyusha rocket launcher, leading to questions about what went wrong.

Was it a command failure?

Military sources said the troop numbers and military equipment at Bulo Marer were adequate for offensive and defensive capabilities for a FOB to hold ground, pending reinforcements, unless some of the weapons malfunctioned or were antiquated. So, why wasn’t Bulo Marer ably defended?

READ: Questions soar after Al Shabaab attack on UPDF base

UPDF soldiers panicked when Al-Shabaab struck, says Museveni

The current top commander of the UPDF in Somalia is Brig Peter Gaetano Omola, a veteran of the war in Somalia and credited alongside his then commander Paul Lokech for beating the al-Shabaab both in the capital, Mogadishu, and in the countryside.

Brig Omola was reportedly in Mogadishu when Bulo Marer was attacked. By contrast, sources identified the commanding officer under him as Lt Col Edward Nyororo who, until early this month, was a UPDF 3rd Division commanding officer adversely named regarding cattle rustling operations in Karamoja, allegations which remained unproven.

In his Executive Order Number 3, Gen Museveni, without naming names, accused some of the UPDF officers of corrupt solicitations and misinforming the higher military command, leading to a wrong decision to withdraw vigilantes guarding kraals and their eventual integration into the mainstream military.

UPDF and Defence Spokesman, Brig Felix Kulayigye, in answer to why Lt Col Nyororo was deployed to Somalia, said “this [allegations against him] is news to me”. It remained unclear whether Lt Col Nyororo was at the FOB when al-Shabaab struck.

Asked about the alleged red flags, the immediate past Commander of the UPDF 3rd Division, Brig Joseph Balikuddembe, who directly supervised Lt Col Nyororo,said “it would be against my code of conduct” to comment and “deployment [of charges] isn’t done by me alone”.

“I handed over the [UPDF 3rd Division Commander] office. I am not competent enough [now] to start discussing those matters,” Brig Balikuddembe said, referring our inquiries to his successor Maj Gen Don Nabasa, who was unavailable. 

In President Museveni’s Saturday night explanation, “some of the soldiers [at Bulo Marer] did not perform as expected and panicked, which disorganised them and the al-Shabaab took advantage of that to overrun the base and destroy some of the equipment”.

Under ATMIS, every troop-contributing country uses its military’s own assets which partners such as the United States and the European Union then replace, often leading to depletion of big and light weapons and in worst cases scarcity of bullets described in one security briefing by the moniker “ground nuts”. 

A senior security officer yesterday suggested that frontline troops would panic if command was ineffective and equipment dysfunctional. “Without good commanders, soldiers are not prepared [for combat], and they don’t know where and when danger is coming,” the officer noted.

The unanswered question is: Were the people assigned to Somalia vetted and by whom? Gen Museveni also took issue with fit-for-purpose status of the Ugandan troops in the Horn of Africa country and questioned the motivations for soldiers going there.

“This unfortunate incident (attack) should be used to remind all those concerned, that operations in Somalia and other theatres, are combat missions and not welfare missions where you can access UN allowances,” he wrote of ATMIS to which some soldiers reportedly buy their way or trade sex to be picked.

The President added: “It is criminal for anybody involved to send into such a theatre soldier[s] who are either not suited for that mission or not properly prepared for it. Details will come out after the Board of Inquiry (BOI) has finished its work.”

Was there intelligence failure?

The Friday dawn onslaught, highly-placed security and diplomatic sources said, was unsurprising because al-Shabaab had - since losing the town in August 2014  - attempted recapture through unsuccessful “probing attacks”  including one in 2018.

In military parlance, a probing attack is a trial breach to test the defences, troop numbers/combat readiness and weapons capability of a target where attackers would be prepared to withdraw if overwhelmed. 

Besides, within the past two weeks, al-Shabaab held “big” meetings reportedly attended by some influential clan elders, and what transpired would have been of interest to ATMIS and Ugandan forces.

Bulo Marer was for years a base where the militant group lived, recruited and trained fighters and imposed and collected taxes undisturbed.

That fortune changed in August 2014 when a combined force of Somali government forces and African Union Peace-keeping Mission in Somalia (Amisom) troops, where Uganda played a pivotal role, ousted the al-Shabaab and captured Bulo Marer.

Alternately spelt as Buulo Mareer, a town roughly midway between Mogadishu and Baraawe on the Indian Ocean coast, the town has a high strategic and security significance. 

ATMIS and the Ugandan contingent were generally aware of al-Shabaab’s continuing interest to overrun or capture Bulo Marer, according to multiple sources, necessitating a proofing against breach.

Like other armies, the UPDF has relied on human intelligence and technical capabilities to source, analyse and distil intelligence. ATMIS receives additional intelligence from the United States that on occasions has conducted targeted strikes either to eliminate al-Shabaab commanders or destroy their arsenal.

One senior security source said the successful incursion by the militant fighters showed failure of intelligence “collection, evaluation, processing and dissemination”.

It remained unclear if the attack had been predicted as Paul Williams, a security scholar and professor of International Affairs at George Washington University in the United States, did in a scholarly paper published on April 27, 2023.

He argued that ATMIS bases were vulnerable to al-Shabaab attacks due to low force strength/morale and poor relations between the troops and locals and he proposed that a FOB be defended by at least two military companies, which is anywhere between 200 to 500 soldiers, contrasting the single company at Bulo Marer base at the time of the Friday dawn raid on UPDF.

Were UPDF outnumbered, outgunned?

President Museveni, citing data captured by an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), noted that the al-Shabaab fighters who attacked Bulo Marer numbered about 800.   If there was only a company (roughly 200-250 soldiers) defending the base, every UPDF soldier on average was defending against four attackers.

The attack happened at about 5:30am, a time within the 4am-6am period known in military as most likely for dawn attacks and requiring highest levels of alertness.

It remains unclear why UPDF troops were unable to put the high impact weapons, among them the t-55 tanks which the invaders captured and burned, to effective use. The investigations team led by UPDF Land Forces Commander, Lt Gen Kayanja Muhanga, will also have to find answers to the question of delayed reinforcements from another base nine kilometres away.

President’s statement on attack

Ugandans and Bazzukulu.

Greetings. Things are moving well on a number of fronts. I have concluded a tour on wealth creation issues in the Masaka zone.Masaka zone is doing well with coffee, bananas, palm oil and the dairy industry.
However, in the night of Thursday, at the 11th hour of the night and ten minutes (what the Europeans call 5.30am of Friday), we had an unfortunate incident in Somalia where our force has operated successfully, ever since 2007. In the area of Bulo-Mareer, there was an FOB (Forward Operational Base) manned by a company of UPDF soldiers. Those defences are quite strong although they are guarded by light weapons.
There were two tanks, two 14.5mm anti- air-craft guns and a 107mm Katyusha rocket launcher. Some of the soldiers there did not perform as expected and panicked, which disorganized them and the Al-Shabaab took advantage of that to overran the base and destroy some of the equipment.
The panic, it seems, was totally unnecessary because, in fact, both the anti-tank ditch and our soldiers had destroyed the 3 vehicles of explosives outside the FOB. The suicide bombers or whatever, were forced to blow themselves up before they gained entry into the base.
Moreover, our UAVs were watching the whole scenario from up in the sky and directing fire. The CDF has set up a Board of Inquiry (BOI) and the full facts will come out, including the details of the casualties.
Many of the soldiers withdrew to the next FOB, nine kilometres away. The terrorists were many, about 800 or so according to the UAVs.
Hence, it was a missed opportunity, to annihilate them. The operations are continuing and they will regret their actions.
Condolences to the country and the families of those who died. This unfortunate incident should be used to remind all those concerned, that operations in Somalia and other theatres, are combat missions and not welfare missions where you can access UN allowances.
It is criminal for anybody involved, to send into such a theatre soldiers who are either not suited for that mission or not properly prepared for it. Details will come out after the BOI has finished its work. 

Signed:
Yoweri K. Museveni
General (rtd)
Ssabalwanyi