Inside the Lhubiriha, Kichwamba ADF attacks

In the aftermath of the attack, First Lady Janet Museveni, who doubles as Education minister, said there had been a “conflict” between “groups in Kasese [District] who wanted to take it [the school] over” and the non-governmental organisation (NGO) that built it. She also revealed that the auditors from the NGO had been at the school the day before the attack.

READ: 3 education officials arrested to aid investigations on school attack

          Survivors of Kasese school attack: What we saw on night of raid
Brig Felix Kulayigye, the Defence ministry and Army spokesperson, last weekend told KFM that “the signature [of the attackers] is ADF, but given the fact that this school has been having wrangles over ownership, we are leaving room open.”
As questions abound in regard to the gross intelligence lapses and the delay to respond to the attack in the area, with a heavy army and police presence, intelligence may need to pore over the details of the Kichwamba attack and another earlier raid staged at Mpondwe in 1996 by suspected ADF insurgents.
Gathering testimonies based on survivors, intelligence leads and evidence that the Ugandan government filed as the counter-memorial at the Hague-based International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo case, we provide an insight into the similar and contrasting patterns of these attacks. 

HERE: 3 abducted students return
For instance, why did the UPDF in the Kichwamba and Mpondwe raids put up a resilient fight against the attackers who were larger in numbers compared to last Friday’s attack that was masterminded by only five criminals? Does this amplify the theory that perhaps individuals involved in a school dispute hired mercenary ADF cells based across the border to attack the school, an act which was not sanctioned by their chief ideologue, Musa Baluku?
Was this the ADF or another criminal group? Did the attack bear a few contrasts as a result of an ideological cleavage in the shifting sands of time that has pitted the radical wing aligned to the Islamic State against the group loyal to its imprisoned founder, Jamil Mukulu? 
1996 attack
Earlier on, the ADF, on September 13, 1996, launched its major attack on Mpondwe customs post, Bwera Town. It resulted in the death of 50 people at the hands of 800 heavily-armed ADF insurgents, who—according to Ugandan intelligence reports—were under the command and control of Congolese and Sudanese commanders. 
“The rebels who participated in the attack were transported by FAZ (Zairean army) troops in FAZ vehicles from various camps in eastern Congo. The arms and ammunition used by the rebels, included more than 1,500 AK 47s, twenty 12.7 mm AAC, GPMGs, and 60/82 mm mortars and a lot of assorted ammunition were provided by the Congolese and Sudanese governments,” an intelligence report reads.
This attack was a culmination of the collaboration that had been cultivated in the first bases of ADF inside DRC after ADF fighters came under the salvo of the UPDF in Buseruka, Hoima District, and fled across Lake Albert.
As reported in 1995 by Ali Bwambale, then ADF’s deputy secretary-general: “During Mobutu’s regime, it’s Zairean troops who were providing us with security and they were the ones coordinating our operations. They were the ones escorting our commanders to Kinshasa for meetings with Mobutu and Sudanese government officials. Congolese coordination of operations was routinely performed at the ADF’s headquarters in Beni.”
He added: “Zaïre generals never visited our hattie field, but they could always come to coordinate our operations at our [headquarters] in Beni. This is confirmed by Vihamba Kule, the director of the “ADF’s external security organisation: During the reign of Mobutu, very many military generals used to visit our camps, most especially Beni where the headquarters of the ADF were.”
Bwambale proceeded to reveal that the ADF got 200 guns from one of the original Congo-based anti-Uganda rebel groups supported by Sudan. The group was known as NALU. 
“Later on, our commanders went to Sudan and got some guns—82 mm [and] 60 mm mortars, 125 mm [machine] guns,” Bwambale disclosed, adding that other weapons “ferried on Zaïre government trucks escorted by Mobutu’s soldiers to our location in Buhira” were GPMGs, RPGs, MMGs, LMGs, MGLs, and SMGs, grenades, mines and ammunitions. 
In his testimony, Ali Lyavala—a founding member of the ADF—revealed that they “established a base at Bunia [in eastern Congo, 30 kilometres from the Uganda border]. This, he added, was “under the direct authority of President Mobutu.” 
As the ADF began to grow, Lyavala said they “opened up a camp at Buhira [20 kilometres from the border].” It was at Buhira “where we were carrying out training for most of the combatants.” Also among the ADF bases were Bunia and Beni, [50 kilometres from the border].
“We continued getting support from President Mobutu until he was overthrown by [Laurent] Kabila,” Lyavala divulged.
Kabila links
When relations between Kabila and his erstwhile allies Uganda and Rwanda quickly broke down, the then DRC President, in September of 1997, appointed Mathias Ebamba commander of Congolese armed forces in eastern Congo. An ex-FAZ colonel, Ebamba had served in a similar role under Mobutu, who had facilitated the latter’s military and logistical assistance to the ADF. Col Ebamba replaced a Banyamulenge officer deemed sympathetic to Uganda.
As Col Ebamba settled into his commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of the Congo or FAC’s Fifth Brigade role in Bunia, a contemporaneous UPDF intelligence report—issued in February of 1998—stated thus: “The former operational brigade commander, Col Ebamba, has been posted back here as the brigade commander, plus many of the former officers. This officer was directly in charge of NALU organisation, training, finance control and operations up to the last moment [NALU] attacked Uganda on November 13, 1996 at Bwera.” 
As reported by ADF Commander Issa Twatera Embundu, shortly after Col Ebamba’s return to the region as military commander of Congolese forces, the Congoleses sent an emissary called Fatuma. A beer seller in Busange, Fatuma was ordered to tell ADF that the Congolese were ready to cooperate with them and provide logistics. 
ADF was thus was asked to stop hostilities against FAC (Kabila’s army). The ADF responded positively to this Congolese overture, and a meeting was arranged with three FAC commanders. ‘’The three commanders expressed disappointment with Mr Museveni’s government and pledged support to ADF. After this meeting they reported to Col lbamba of FAC in Bunia, who took the message to President Kabila.... who agreed to support the ADF.” 
As a direct result, FAC officers—Col Ebamba, Lt Col Mayara, Captain Kascereka and Captain Pangole— delivered weapons to the ADF. Another ADF combatant revealed that “Col Ebamba [in Beni] and Lt Col Mayara, a brigade commander based in Bunia, were appointed as collaborators who would act as go-between the rebels and the DRC government for logistical support and sanctuary ....” 
Uganda protested to President Kabila about the activities of these officers, and urged that they be replaced. This, though, was to no avail. In fact, the ADF’s Chief Director, Yusuf Kabanda, met frequently with President Kabila in Kinshasa, and dealt directly with Cabinet ministers and ADF leaders to coordinate strategy and arrange supplies and support, reads the counter-memorial.
President Kabila himself introduced Kabanda to one Solomon Kasereka of Mutendero, Butembo. Kasereka brought Congolese combatants into the ADF, from local “Mai Mai” militia groups and Katangese gendarmes loyal to President Kabila. 
As reported by ADF Commander Junju Juma, who headed the ADF’s Presidential Protection Unit, DRC military officers coordinated the ADF’s recruitment, training, weapons, supplies and operations during this period. Brig Bambu was responsible for ferrying ammunition from Kinshasa to ADF in Beni, Col Mayara was responsible for receiving ADF contacts/logistics from Sudan and delivering them to ADF in the Rwenzori mountains.
Elsewhere, Maj Wamulamba was charged with coordinating ADF activities between Sudan-Kinshasa and Kisangani. Maj Abdallah Kule, who was charged with overseeing operations in Butembo, received a consignment of ammunition air-dropped by Kinshasa government destined to ADF. Captain James Kaseru was pivotal in linking up Interahamwe with ADF. He did this, intelligence reports show, with the blessing of the Kabila government amongst others. 
Kichwamba attack
Reports indicate that logistics and manpower from Kinshasa government to ADF rebels was under the control of Kasareka, a civilian who served as “chief link between ADF, Kabila government and Congolese civilians.... coordinates movement of troops and logistics from Kabila government and ADF.”
By the time Kichwamba Technical School was attacked, the ADF was still receiving support from the Kinshasha government. In fact, earlier in 1997, the ADF had acted on a false intelligence tip and attempted to attack the Technical School at the time the students were on holiday. They later raided Kihondwa Trading Centre where they looted food and goats.
In July 1997, the ADF raided various villages across western Uganda where they killed 28 civilians and abducted 14 others at Ntokoro in Bundibugyo District. 
The following month, they killed 35 people at Karambi in Kabarole District. On September 14, they killed 30 displaced persons at a refugee camp in Nyakahuka, Bundibugyo District. In response to these attacks, and as relations between Kampala and Kinshasa thawed, at President Kabila’s invitation in December 1997, Uganda sent two UPDF battalions. These consisted of 1,200 men into eastern Congo, and were meant to supplement the much smaller force that had been sent in May. 
The two battalions set up camps near Beni and Butembo, close to the Ugandan border, and together with some of the Kinshasa government’s army units in the region began to root out ADF and West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) insurgents from their Congolese bases. 
A few days before June 8, 1998, the ADF rebels had camped in the forested gullies and mist-covered Rwenzori ranges. As a result of intelligence lapses that failed to act on the warnings, a raid at the technical institute was actualised.
“On Sunday evening [June 7, 1998,] I had gone for an evening walk together with my friends Joseph and Frank along Bundibugyo Road down the hills. We met there a group of five men we suspected to be rebels. It was around 7.30 pm. They convinced us to continue walking to Karugutu. We refused and returned to the college and I jokingly told my colleagues in the dormitory what had transpired. I told them that these were rebels and were coming to attack the college at night,” recalls Joab Kaganda, a survivor.
Eventually, the ADF raided the school in the night, overpowered the UPDF and killed 80 students. Most of them died in an inferno after the rebels doused dormitories with petrol. Hundreds more of the students were abducted.
According to ADF participants and the counter-memorial filed at the Hague, “the attackers divided themselves into three units: one group of 24 staged an ambush on the way to the school to prevent Ugandan soldiers from rescuing the students; a second unit of 36 attacked the school, armed with high-powered weapons and eight jerricans of petrol, and the third unit attacked the UPDF detachment at Kanyamura, which was close to the school.”
The group went on rampage, attacking the same area on June 10 where they killed five more civilians and spread mayhem on 26 June at Banyangule Village, in Bundibugyo District, killing or wounding 11; and again, on July 5 at Kiburara, in Kasese District, where they abducted 19 seminarians from St John’s Seminary. On August 1, 1998 the ADF launched an attack on Kasese Town, burning houses and stores and killing three.
Changing faces
Historically, the ADF was an unabashedly Ugandan group, with Congolese (often unwillingly) making up a sizeable portion of the lower ranks.  New videos, however, feature fighters from Tanzania, Burundi, and other countries who appeal to their compatriots and the broader Muslim community to join their fight. They speak in Kiswahili (both Congolese and Tanzanian dialects),   Luganda, Arabic, French and Kinyarwanda.
The ADF was clearly positioning itself as  part of the global jihadist movement. While these efforts may seem fairly modest by the standards of other jihadist groups, it is important to contrast them with the ADF’s history of very limited propaganda output, reflecting its secretive approach. 
Initially, Jamil Mukulu was ardently opposed to the connection to the Islamic State. This was partly on ideological grounds; Mukulu’s willingness to kill civilians does not seem to have extended to fellow Muslims as a takfirist ideology would require. 
In 2019, an individual only known as David—a self-described Mukulu-aligned operative—explained his dislike of this ideology to a Uganda-based recruiter. He said: “Baluku says it openly that a Muslim who doesn’t support Arabs from Iraq, his blood is allowed to be poured, and the truth is that he pours it without fear of the owner of this earth.”
Baluku’s decision to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State was a step too far for Mukulu and his followers. In early 2019, a small band of Mukulu loyalists split from the larger corps that followed Baluku.
The breakaway group is reported to have 10-15 fighters in DRC, led by a man called Muzaaya, and, according to one former  member, is affiliated  with  a  training  camp in South Africa headed  by Mukulu’s son Hassan Nyanzi.
Benjamin Kisokeranio, an  ADF member who was granted honorary historical status for being the son of the founder of NALU, appears to be the highest ranking member to have defected  over  the disagreement. 
Despite this split, Baluku has remained faithful to his pledge to the Islamic State, ridiculing those who left and reaping the benefits of the Islamic State’s propaganda apparatus. 

Islamic State in Central Africa
There are major contrasts between the tactical deployments and ideology of the ADF then under Mukulu and Musa Baluku, its current leader. For one, the latter has paid allegiance to the Islamic State. The Islamic State’s central propaganda apparatus first referenced its “Central Africa Province” in April 2019, taking credit for an assumed ADF attack in DRC. In March 2021, the US Department of State designated the ADF as a foreign terrorist organisation.
In September 2020, Baluku stated in one propaganda video that, “There is no ADF anymore.  Allah willing, ADF  ceased  to  exist  a  long  time  ago.  [...]  Currently, we are a province, the Central Africa Province which is one province among the numerous provinces that make up the Islamic State that is under the Caliph and Leader of all   Muslims...Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi.” 
According to a paper produced by George Washington University titled The Islamic State in Congo, in 2014—on the heels of Sukola, a MONUSCO-backed Congolese military (FARDC) offensive against the ADF—a major shift in the group’s operations was underway. The ADF began to indiscriminately target civilians, including young  children and elderly  persons, in  a  wave  of  horrific retributive  massacres, largely  using  machetes,  axes,  and  small  arms.
In 2016 and 2017, the group began engaging in social media-based propaganda and recruitment campaigns targeted primarily at regional audiences in Africa. Consequently, it reframed how it described and legitimised its operational and strategic activities. It ultimately rebranded as a global jihadist group and “the Islamic State in Central Africa.”
By 2018, the Islamic State confirmed the establishment of an Islamic State in Central Africa (ISCAP), and then, in April 2019, the Islamic State acknowledged its first attacks in the DRC. What emerges is that while there is currently little evidence of direct command and control by the Islamic State, having adopted the Islamic State’s ideology and strategy, the ADF has demonstrated  a  willingness to frame its operations as part of the Islamic State’s global effort and contribute to its campaigns of ‘attrition’ and ‘breaking the walls.’