Revisiting origin of the Congo gold scam

We should hasten to point out that in this struggle John Kakonge represented the forces of national-democratic liberation and Grace Ibingira those against national-democratic liberation.

By national-democratic liberation is meant a movement to eliminate national and colonial oppression (to say nothing of winning economic independence and the attendant tasks of socio-economic progress) as well as forge the nation of Uganda. It also was a movement of breaking up feudal and pre-feudal relations.

After his election as Secretary General of the party, in December 1964, Grace Ibingira left for the US to shop for funds and support. William Wilberforce Nadiope and other Ibingira supporters were also to make trips to the US. It is said that while they were in the US "...they freely hinted that Dr Obote would soon be out of office and that the USA could expect a more friendly and responsible government when they assumed power."

From the US, Grace Ibingira returned with money estimated by Obote to be one million dollars. (Obote, A.M. 1968:35). "By 1965 there was a sudden manifestation of opulence among a section of UPC leadership generally associated with Ibingira, including Branch Chairman. There was talk about Ibingira and "the dollars" at all levels of the party," Dan Nabudere tells us in his book, "Imperialism and Revolution in Uganda." With this money, the resistance to national-democratic liberation embarked on a protracted struggle to remove Obote from the leadership of the UPC.

As though to underscore his national-democratic credentials as well as draw a stark contrast with Ibingira, Dr Obote later in the middle of 1965 made a prolonged visit to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and China. "On his return Dr Obote was greeted by a concerted series of increasingly bitter challenges to his visits and foreign policy. In a blazing speech--whose lack of specific names was a device which left few Ugandans in doubt as to its targets--Minister of State Grace Ibingira claimed that Dr Obote has aligned himself with the East, forfeited Uganda's independence external position, or betrayed his party. For this, Ibingira held, he must be summarily removed from Office.

Speaking for the Prime Minister, A.A. Nekyon (Obote's kinsman from Lango and his regular hatchet man) and John Kakonge in substantive near identical addresses blasted certain Ugandan politicians--self-evidently the Ibingira group--as bought agents of a foreign power 9presumably the USA in Kakonge's speech, slightly more flexibly identifiable in Nekyon's) whose betrayal of the people of Uganda must lead to removal by the proper authorities (Dr Obote and a UPC Delegates conference)."

Writing in the South African paper, The Guardian --radical in Novemebr 1966, Andre de la Rue observed of this debate, "..foreign policy was not central in the thinking or strategy of either camp--the prize was government." The struggle had begun.

Before this debate, Grace Ibingira had enlisted the support (nay involvement) of the Kabaka of Buganda in his struggles against Obote. This must not have been that difficult. In the first place the Kabaka was well-predisposed to working with Grace Ibingira against any moves of the national-democratic liberation. As a king and a leader of the dominating identity, he was not only a target of but was ideologically inclined to fight national-democratic liberation.

In fact we are told by Professor Mutibwa that the Kabaka and his advisers were actually on the hunt for allies outside Buganda. "That was why Mutesa and his advisers, who included influential people such as Prince Badru Kakungulu, his uncle and the leader of Uganda Muslim Community, worked out plans which would get them political friends outside Buganda while at the same time controlling their sub-state.

"In this lies the plan of their coalition with Grace Ibingira, the Secretary General of the UPC -i.e. to join and penetrate the UPC with the aim of outvoting Obote in his party. The Baganda faithfully joined the UPC en masse, and strengthened Ibingira's group which consisted of all those leaders who came from families that possessed traditional authority in the colonial system, who now ranged against the centre of the party led by Obote. Such leaders included men like as Nadiope (Kyabazinga of Busoga and the Vice-President of Uganda and UPC), Matia Ngobi and George Magezi. Mutesa saw the rift between the Right and the Centre of the UPC, and he decided to exploit it." (Mutibwa, P.M. 89-90)

More pointedly Mutibwa tells us: "The political dispute between Obote and Ibingira and his supporters centered around the control of UPC and ultimately the very leadership of the country in terms of the political and economic ideologies that were to be followed. Obote claimed--not without justification--that Ibingira's group which included President Sir Edward Mutesa and the Buganda government at Mengo and counted on the the support and assistance of the Army Commander Brigadier Opolot wanted to remove him from power, and that plans to this end were in advanced stage by the end of 1965. No one let alone Ibingira and his supporters has denied that they wanted to see Obote and those who believed in socialist philosophies removed. Their only regret is that they failed." (Mutibwa, P. 1992: 38)

Initially the alliance worked on enlarging the Annual Delegates Conference of UPC, the organ which elects the President of the party, in such a manner that the resistance to national-democratic liberation would be in the majority. (Obote, A.M. 1968:20) For this, a scheme which Professor Mazrui appropriately named the "Trojan Horse" was contrived.

Trojan Horse
As many Baganda as possible were to be "herded" into UPC. To effect this, in July 1965 Edward Mutesa, the Kabaka of Buganda and President of Uganda convened and chaired a meeting of KY at which it was decided that KY members should join UPC in large numbers. Once in the party they were to use their numerical strength to change the leadership of the party.

To spur the Baganda into joining the UPC, members of the Cabinet who were part of the plot, deliberately leaked to the press cabinet resolutions on the plan to call surprise elections. In the leakage it was pointed out that the impending elections could effect the re-election of Mutesa as President of Uganda, unless the Baganda were in a commanding position within the UPC.

As expected the leakage alarmed the Baganda, and they enlisted as members of the UPC in large numbers. As all this was happening, in the absence of Obote, who was out of (added) the country visiting the Far East, Grace Ibingira as Secretary General of UPC convened an executive meeting of the party to consider proposals to increase the number of representatives from Buganda to the National Council from 3 to 18. Much as this proposal was resoundingly defeated, it was tabled again for discussion in the first week of October 1965 when it was once again defeated.

When it became clear that the "Trojan Horse" stratagem could not work, Obote's opponents resorted to attempting an outright military coup. Scheduled to take place on Independence Day (9th October, 1965), clear evidence of it first got revealed on 7th October 1965. That day five incidents which initially appeared coincidental, but which were later found to have been orchestrated occurred.

First, Obote in his capacity as Prime Minister received a letter from Mengo (Mutesa) informing him that a group of left-wingers (Communists) were intending to overthrow the Government on or about 9th October 1965. The letter requested the Prime Minister as head of Government to issue a statement condemning any such plot.

The second incident was an allegation made at the end of a Cabinet meeting by Grace Ibingira that he had uncovered a plot to assassinate several people, including himself, during the independence anniversary.

The third was a letter written to the Minster of Internal Affairs by the late Daudi Ochieng, KY Member of Parliament, and copied to the Prime Minister, requesting the Minister to send a senior Police Officer to take statement from an unnamed person regarding the activities of Idi Amin, Deputy Commander of the Army. In the letter Daudi Ochieng observed that upon taking the statement, the Government would suspend Amin from the Army.

The fourth incident was a report by the then Commander of the Uganda Army, Shaban Opolot, to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defense that Opolot had received information that Baganda were plotting to assassinate him, and that soldiers from the Congo would attack the headquarters of the Uganda Army during the independence anniversary celebrations. The object of all these reports - all of which were investigated and found to be false -- was to create confusion and panic so that the coup could be carried out.

The fifth aspect of the conspiracy was the activities of Major Katabarwa, brother of Grace Ibingira who was Commandant of the Army Training Wing stationed in Jinja. He went to Kampala on 7th October, 1965 and on return to Jinja contacted a number of officers, including two who were on open charge and therefore not on duty, to draw arms and report to Brigadier Opolot at Army Headquarters in Kampala. However, much as these officers reported and "virtually took control of the Army Headquarters", the army refused to carry out their orders and the intended coup failed.

The failure of the October coup plot did not discourage the plotters, rather it spurred them to make a more daring attempt. The major move in this attempt was made in November, 1965 when Brigadier Opolot arranged for two units of the Army to exchange barracks.(Obote, A.M. 1968:23) The intention of this change was to remove the army unit stationed in Jinja, and which had refused to participate in the coup attempt the previous month.

However, according to the regulations then in force, such a change could only take place after notification which have been issued be given six months prior, and with the approval of the Chief of Defense Staff Committee composed of senior officers and chaired by the Minister responsible for Defense. Brigadier Opolot was violating all the regulations."

The notification was made on 28th November 1965 in a secret letter to the Commanders of the two units, and the change over was to be completed by the end of December 1965. The Chief of Defense Staff Committee knew nothing about the change, and the Ministry was not informed although the secret letter was said to have been copied to the Ministry."(Obote, A.M. 1968: 23) The secret leaked out and Obote ordered Brigadier Opolot to follow proper procedure.

Then in December 1965, Mutesa placed orders for heavy weapons with a Kampala firm. The arms were to come from Britain. On this Obote was later to write: "We have letters from a British firm which show that the firm was not happy with the orders on the grounds that the weapons ordered were too heavy for an individual and that the firm had always dealt with Governments only. One of the letters from the Kampala firm states that President Mutesa had placed the orders on behalf of the Uganda Army and that, although the Kabaka's Government was to pay for the arms, that only meant that the President, in his capacity as the Kabaka, was to have the first trial of arms before handing them over to the army."

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