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African rulers serve at the mercy of armies

Patrick K. Kajuma

What you need to know:

  • The literature on the breakdown of democratic transitions, generally, should not overlook the single most powerful entities in many of these cases: which is the military.

The understanding of civilian participation in military regimes has remained limited or requires deeper analytical attention. We are alive to the fact that when soldiers seize political power, the minds of citizens tend to conjure up assumptions about military rule where there is an imagination of officers in military fatigues dictating legislation and the outlawing of political participation.

But to the greater extents some militaries govern through a collegial entity although others ‘personalise’ political power. But what is the independent nature of the military and its influence on political outcomes? Looking at praetorianism as the political system where civilians serve in government at the pleasure (and by permission) of the army, we see Praetorian armies becoming unique political actors, positioned to shape and determine the outcomes of transitions. Praetorian states existing in Africa cannot be taken to be military dictatorships because they exist in three different types of praetorian armies (rulers, guardians and moderators). The literature on the breakdown of democratic transitions, generally, should not overlook the single most powerful entities in many of these cases: which is the military.

Praetorian armies, as found in the political turmoil’s of Egypt, Mali, the two Sudan’s and Ugandan case in the early 80’s cannot be seen as mere bystanders, nor neutral observers to the momentous political changes materialising in countries. Conversely, armies have by far been the most consequential actors in the political arena both influencing and responding to events.

For instance in Egypt there was the January 25 uprising, the parliamentary elections of 2011-2012, plus the rise and subsequent fall of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Uganda we had controversial elections of 1980, where it’s believed that they were rigged plus the extra judicial killings of the wanainchi during Amin and Obote’s reigns. In all these cases, including events in Mali, Tunisia, Gambia, Burkina Faso etc, armies have clearly defined interests, prerogatives and objectives, where they have sought to defend either by manipulating a given political arrangement, the so-called “ruling but not governing formula” (Cook 2007), or by taking over power themselves.

Military coups that had bedeviled Africa after decades of the aftermath of independence have now become more rampant in the continent. In 2017, a coup brought Robert Mugabe’s 37-year rule in Zimbabwe to an end, In 2019 alone Sudan, Gabon and Ethiopia were threatened with military coups. In September 2021, the President of Guinea Alpha Condé was toppled and the country has had two military coups in 2022. Judd Devermont from the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, believes a “lenient” approach by regional and international bodies “has enabled coup leaders to make minimal concessions while preparing for longer stays in power”. But also it can be said no revolution of the masses can triumph without the help of a portion of the armed forces that sustained the old regime (Lenin 1916).

Several comparativists hold the view that coups generally take place in countries that had coups before. African armies should be highly adaptable and allow for various configurations of authority, but ultimately preserve their ‘’raison d’être’’- reason or justification for existence of their military as the hegemonic and preeminent institution within their states. Presidents can always come and go, but the armies should remain firmly in control.

Uganda’s polity is not a fully civilian-based government because the military is in many spheres of governance; although, to be sure, at different stages of political transition, various elements of personality are at play, and the country’s transition from a single movement party state to multiparty politics has remained unequivocal for decades now. Thus, however much the military has opted to retreat into a “moderator type”, it is still within the superseding praetorian framework which scenario may live with us for a long time while even in the post-Museveni era.

Mr Kajuma is a MPA Scholar, UMI