Behold Niger, Gabon: Is a military coup still possible in Uganda?

In the “Coup Belt” of Africa, BBC says Sudan has had 17 coups, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone 10 each, nine for Guinea Bissau, eight for Mali, Niger and Nigeria, and seven for Chad. Further down, we shall discuss Uganda over coffee, then add that Burundi has had 11 and Comoros nine.

Are military coups good, or bad? And, is a coup likely or possible in Uganda? We are talking about a place where the National Resistance Movement (NRM) has built a cake of autocracy, sprinkled generously with a layer of icing sugar in the form of rudimentary and even comical ideological window-dressing to make it look like a democracy forged by an elite egalitarian outfit. 

To say military coups are good or bad is to risk throwing out the baby with the bath water: each must be evaluated on its own merits. Democracy is a good thing. But a corrupt democracy that has turned into an inept, corrupt dictatorship and kleptocracy is hard to live with when there is an option of “A Few Good Men” (seen the movie?) in military fatigues who possess maturity to discern that the country is stuck on a wrong course, the patriotic inclination to feel a higher sense of duty to God and country to take power so as to restore sanity, and the courage to actualise their convictions. 

So, given that sheer desirability thereof is best discussed over coffee and sandwiches, let’s ask, is a military coup likely or possible in Uganda? 

One needs to appreciate the common denominators that run through countries that have suffered/benefited from (take your pick) military coups. Between 1950 and 2021, worldwide, some statistics suggest, there have been something in the region of 242 successful coups and 244 failed ones. 

Intelligent extrapolation would, therefore, suggest that anyone mounting a coup has roughly 50 percent chance of success – partly because it’s not always easy to hold onto power after getting it. You can take that to the bank!

Coups have been largely successful in relatively poor countries. For nearly all of them, the dividing line between the party, the state and a criminal enterprise has been non-existent. Most have had a definite political centre, which is a single capital city, home to all administrative and bureaucratic headquarters. 

And, read this slowly, coups are easier in countries with a high concentration of power; meaning you target a small power area and you have everything in your hand. It would be a more complex operation if you had scattered and separate centres that wield actual power, because coups are not about overwhelming displays of firepower – they are quick, precise surgical operations.

Crafty rulers have learnt to split up power centres in government and the military, and police and intelligence services, each actively spying on and fighting the other: it becomes difficult for one to conspire with each and everyone of them without the secret leaking, or with all of them agreeing to work with the plotters. 

Bila shaka (without doubt) the Ugandan leader has studied closely how his predecessors Idi Amin and Milton Obote lost power, and set in place precautions and contingencies to secure his grip. Apart from taking power forcefully in 1986, this is his only other unqualified success as a ruler.

He has set up both military and government in such a way that away from himself, it is hard to know where power actually lies, so it would be a tough exam for top military officers to have him for dinner.

But then again, we have a problem here: when predicting coups, they seem impossible; but when they happen, they appear, on hindsight, to have been inevitable.

Gawaya Tegulle is an advocate of the High Court of Uganda     [email protected]