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How can we learn from Kiteezi landfill disaster
What you need to know:
- he post Kiteezi disaster debates in the Parliament, the provision of tents to the affected, accusations and counter accusations amongst political and technical leaders within Kampala Capital City Authority only demonstrate a simplistic and reductionist approach within a reactive patching paradigm
On the morning of August 9, 2024, news of a garbage slide started making rounds on social media, radio stations and other channels. By 16 August, 35 deaths were reported by the Uganda Police Force, but many more are still buried with some never going to be recovered. But what is perplexing, is that in an era where a country like Uganda takes pride in subscribing to the SENDAI Framework 2015-2030, they are still reactive, as opposed to proactive disaster risk reduction procedures, practices and research.
The post Kiteezi disaster debates in the Parliament, the provision of tents to the affected, accusations and counter accusations amongst political and technical leaders within Kampala Capital City Authority only demonstrate a simplistic and reductionist approach within a reactive patching paradigm.
Importantly, while all hazards are natural, disasters are man made within a complex social system in which simplistic analyses do not detect latent failures. Incubation of the Kiteezi landfill disaster could have begun after the landfill was selected in 1996.
In his book, Systems-Thinking for Safety: A Short Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Systems-Thinking, Bennett Simons argues that systems-thinking explains the origins of incidents, accidents and near-misses, origins that are a product of the social, economic, political and technical – scientific environment.
If we borrow from the Actor-Network theory lens of systems-thinking, the Kiteezi landfill disaster bears the trademarks of a systems accident overwhelmed by a divided political environment surrounded by indecisive decision making, poor understanding of hazards to determine risk calculation, poor risk perception and communication, but most important the desire to address latent and active failures within the system. It is not surprising, conversations prior to the waste slides revolved around how full the landfill was, and the need to relocate, as opposed to the risk that the dumped waste itself possessed the potential to trigger loss of lives and destroy property – the Kiteezi disaster.
Blamism, by the various actors, is only reductionist, but worst still accusations and counter accusations derail the need to focus on a government instituted inquiry through a systems thinking investigative approach. while the recovery process still unfolds.
Disaster risk reduction practitioners note that interactions between humans and the environment make such systems fragile, which leads to systems failures and disasters.
Critically dissecting the media reported activities of gas miners, garbage sorters/collectors, waste disposers, among others could also add value to learning from this disaster.
Garbage collectors resting shelters at the top and housing units at the bottom of landfill- with no access routes to allow a coordinated response, suggests a poor safety culture within the system, expounded through organised chaos that continues to demonstrate latency in failure to implement policies and procedures.
James Reason, a prominent disaster risk reduction theorist argues that it has now become recognised that people working in complex systems make errors or violate procedures for reasons beyond the scope of individual psychology, which reasons are latent. But how can we learn from the Kiteezi landfill disaster?
As we grapple with where to temporarily or permanently depose Kampala City generated garbage, active learning as propounded by Brian Tofts and Simon Reynolds, would help us understand this Kiteezi Disaster, relate it to other disasters within the waste disposal industry to shape future waste disposal decisions. Other open waste disposal slides such as that in Turkey were triggered by a methane explosion, and such possibilities- on Kiteezi, had been reported to Kampala City Council in 2008, but were ignored as part of early warning.
Nonetheless, as Bennett Simons notes, a thorough systems investigation will help us understand the politics of failure on how historical decisions of politicians, civil servants, regulators had to do irrationality. It also exposes the potential to safeguard against victimisation and, in extremis, miscarriages of justice.
Athor: Robert Evans Sekadde ,
A Disaster Risk Reduction enthusiast (graduate of public health; Risk, Crisis and Disaster Management)
