Cases of obtaining money by false pretence have been increasing in Uganda since 2020, with a record of more than 10,700 cases reported in 2023.
The police’s 2023 crime report marks out obtaining money by false pretence for showcasing unparalleled dominance under the economic crimes category. In fact, empirical evidence shows that cases of the same have been on the increase since 2020.
The numbers increased from 8,069 cases in 2020 to 8,634 in 2021 and jumped to 10,652 cases in 2022 before hitting 10,709 last year.
Among those is an increasing number of cases in which Ugandan conmen have left many unsuspecting people from different countries across the world in tears. This after stealing from them billions of shillings, with promises of securing them multimillion shillings contracts that never were.
The most prominent cases of fraud that have occurred in recent times include one in which the Qatar-based Ascend Group lost $306,950 (about Shs1.2 billion) in a presidential schools project that turned out to be a sham. Others are International PV Development Company (IPVDC), a Canada-based solar power firm, that lost $50,000 (about Shs186.9 million) in a presidential solar power project that never was; the South African-based Jordan Valley Limited which lost $220,000,about Shs807 million; and a case in which Chinese nationals were left $500,000 (about Shs1.8 billion) poorer following a sham oil exploration agreement.
Handiwork of hackers?
All the cases follow a similar pattern. Bar the fraud case involving the South Africans, which was initiated via the business and employment-focused social media platform, LinkedIn, initial contact in the other cases was established via email addresses associated with government departments.
Mr Chris Magoba, the spokesperson of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority (PPDA), said the problem was so grave that the entity was forced to try to intervene.
“We wrote to the responsible government agencies because it is not our mandate to manage government domains and we asked them to follow up on the matter. We unfortunately have not gotten any response from them,” Mr Magoba said.
So, are the rogue elements accessing government domains? Mr Apollo Ssekitoleko, an Information Technology expert, said one of two things, or both, could be happening. The first scenario is that hackers might have found a way around cyber gatekeeping.
“To get an email coming off that domain name you have to have administrative rights to log in through the email servers. Where the domain name serves as both a website and email server, as is
the case with most government ministries and departments, it means that the domain name has been hacked for someone to get an email off it,” Mr Ssekitoleko told Monitor.
Mr Ssekitoleko, however, hastened to point out that there is a possibility that the emails that they are using are masked to look like they are off government domains whereas they are not.
“They mimic the email addresses of different departments. So from the outside, it will look like the email is coming from, let us say [email protected], whereas not. When you put a pointer to it you realise that it is actually a redirection. On the outside, it appears as if it is coming from the government, but inside, it is embedded with a different email address,” Mr Sekitoleko added.
Police escorts
The victims reported that the orchestrators of each of the acts of fraud had armed uniformed police escorts from either the Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) or the VIP Protection Units. Mr Tunji Johnson of International PV Development Company (IPVDC) disclosed that police officers were involved in picking him up from the airport before he was chauffeured to project sites in Busunju and Pader as well as the House.
“At the airport, Nile Links sent Mr Nathan, a logistics officer,Mr Peter and a police officer, a jeep and an escort car to welcome and pick us up from the airport,” Mr Tunji wrote.
So, how does one get police escorts? Mr Kituuma Rusoke, the police spokesperson, said ordinary Ugandans can apply to the Inspector General Police (IGP) who approves once the applicant is vetted and the IGP is convinced that the applicant requires the services.
“Persons with security threats are assessed and qualified by government security agencies. These can be sensitive witnesses. Others are granted such escorts by their statuses as for example
ministers, judges or heads of government departments,” Mr Rusoke told this publication.
How come then that some of the fraudsters have access to the same escort services? That has led to talk of possible collusion between the police and fraudsters, which Mr Rusoke dismissed.
“Somebody will come and present a threat or become a person of interest to the state and is given security but still continues to commit fraudulent acts around town. Or he is a Member of Parliament, who is enjoying the privilege but is involved in human trafficking. The police might not always know the other side of people,” Mr Rusoke clarified.
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Govt premises
Negotiations and signing of the contract agreements were in all these cases conducted on government premises. Whereas the Chinese signed their fake agreement from within the precincts of the Amber House headquarters of the Energy ministry, fraudsters took the Qataris, the Canadians and the South Africans to the premises of Parliament.
“The final negotiations transpired at the chairman of the Special Contracts Committee’s office, located within the Parliament Building,” Mr Khan told this publication.
Mr Tunji had a similar story to tell.
“Mr Natan,Peter of Nile Links [was] sent with a black Jeep to pick us up from the hotel to the Uganda Parliament. The contract was signed from within Parliament,” Mr Tunji wrote while describing the events that set the ground for the fraud.
It emerged that the negotiations and signing of the particular agreement took place in the Government Chief Whip’s boardroom. Security at the House has for some time now been tight.
Visitors to Parliament are subjected to rigorous vetting processes that entail calling the office or officer that the visitor is going to. The visitor is only let through once the officer confirms knowledge of the person.
Visitors are then required to hand in their identification documents in exchange for a visitors’ tag, which they have around their necks during the entire duration of the visit. Visitors without identification papers are usually escorted to and from the office they intend to visit.
Tourists, we have established, are vetted by the Directorate of Communications and Public Affairs.
Employees of the Parliamentary Commission, employees of MPs, mostly drivers and personal assistants are required to at all times have identification tags hanging around their necks. How then could the fraudsters have accessed the Chief Whip’s boardroom on a working day? Was there collusion on the part of the legislators, employees of the Parliamentary Commission and security personnel at Parliament? Sources at Parliament have since pointed an accusing finger in the direction of a high-ranking official in the parliamentary caucus of the NRM.
“He is friends with the architects of the scheme that left the Canadians in tears. It was upon his request that they accessed the Government Chief Whip’s boardroom,” a member of the NRM caucus told Monitor.
The claim could not be independently verified, but Mr Chris Obore, Parliament’s director for communications and public affairs, conceded in an earlier interview that there are still a few loopholes that fraudsters are still exploiting.
“When MPs come to Parliament they can even come with people who loiter around. So many people masquerade to be either employees or even MPs and dupe people in the name of Parliament,” Mr Obore said.
Enter lawyers, minister
In all the cases that have so far been documented, money had been remitted to the fraudsters through the bank accounts of established law firms. The State House Anti-Corruption Unit, to which Mr Souhel Imtiaz Khan of Ascend Group ran after he fell victim to the fraudsters, summoned lawyers from two law firms in Kampala for questioning in line with his matter. We understand that no further action was taken against them.
A lawyer, who is conversant with the matter, told this publication that the lawyers could not be held accountable because their role in the matter was discovered to have been limited to receiving funds on behalf of their Ugandan clients.
“They sign escrow agreements. The lawyer’s role is to receive money from foreign nationals and pass it on to Ugandan clients. Even where it is discovered that the money was obtained by false pretences, the lawyers cannot be held accountable. The criminal liability lies with those who received the money,” the lawyer explained.
Except in the case of the Chinese, the other victims met a senior member of Mr Museveni’s Cabinet. Mr Souhel Imtiaz Khan, for example, said he met the said government official at the Sheraton Hotel on August 17,2022.
“The purpose of our meeting at the Sheraton Hotel was to discuss the construction of the school project,a presidential project. He (the former Cabinet minister) expressed his keen interest in progressing with the contract and the associated work during our discussions. His commitment instilled confidence and trust in me to proceed further with the contract,” Mr Khan explained.
As was in Khan’s case, the meeting with the government official was pivotal in informing the victims’ decision to remit money to the fraudsters who remain at large.
DECEPTIVE TACTICS
- l Use of official emails and police escorts: Fraudsters used emails that appeared to come from government domains and provided police escorts to make their schemes more believable. This created an illusion of legitimacy, enhancing trust among their victims.
- Meetings at government premises: Many negotiations and contract signings occurred in government buildings such as Parliament and the Energy ministry headquarters, reinforcing the scam’s credibility.
- Involvement of high-profile figures: Some victims were misled after meeting with or being associated with a senior Cabinet member, which added further legitimacy to the frauds.
